



MACRO STATISTICAL BULLETIN DECEMBER 2013

Table 1: Macroeconomic Indicators in the MEFMI Region 2009-2014

		Country	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
							Estimates	Forecasts
		Angola	14.0	15.3	11.4	9.0	8.0	7.0-9.0
		Botswana	8.2	6.9	8.5	8.7	6.5	
C		Lesotho	7.3	3.6	5.0	6.1	5.0	4.9
òn		Kenya	9.2	4.0	14.0	9.4	7.0	
mus		Malawi	8.4	7.4	7.6	21.3	23.1	15.0
Consumer prices-annual Average	Inflation Rates	Mozambique	3.3	12.7	8.4	5.6	5.4	:
ces-	tion	Namibia	8.8	4.5	5.1	6.5	6.0	
ann	Ra	Swaziland	7.5	4.5	6.1	8.9	8.1	
lua	tes	Rwanda	10.3	2.3	5.7	6.3	4.2	6.3
A		Tanzania	12.1	7.6	12.7	16.0	9.9	
era		Uganda	13.0	4.0	18.7	14.0	6.0	
ge		Zambia	13.4	8.5	9.0	7.3	7.1	6.5
		Zimbabwe	6.5	3.1	3.5	3.7	4.5	
		Angola	2.4	3.4	3.9	5.2	7.1	8.8
		Botswana	-4.9	7.2	7.2	4.1	6.1	
		Lesotho	3.4	7.1	2.8	6.5	3.4	4.5
		Kenya	2.6	5.8	4.4	4.6	5.8	
	Real GDP Growth	Malawi	8.9	11.1	2.9	1.9	5.4	6.0
		Mozambique	6.3	6.8	7.3	7.5	8.4	:
	Ď	Namibia	-1.1	6.3	5.7	4.0	4.2	•••
	Gr	Swaziland	1.2	2.0	1.3	-1.5	0.0	
	ow t	Rwanda	6.2	7.2	8.2	8.0	6.6	7.5
	⇒	Tanzania	6.0	7.0	6.4	6.9	7.0	
		Uganda	4.1	6.2	6.3	2.6	4.8	
		Zambia	6.4	7.6	6.8	7.3	7.8	7.0
		Zimbabwe	5.7	11.4	11.9	10.6	3.4	
S	<u> </u>	Angola	5.2	8.6	17.2			
Savings	Gross National	Botswana	18.5	36.0	21.2		30.7	
Sg	na vi	Lesotho	19.0	7.8	12.4	18.7	18.8	20.2
		Kenya	12.9	11.8	14.0	12.2		
		Malawi	19.0	24.7	9.4	12.7	18.9	18.1

	Gro	Mozambique	4.3	9.3	11.3			
	Gross National Savings	Namibia	24.7	18.6	26.9	30.4		
	latio	Swaziland	0.3	-5.3	-1.6			
	ona	Rwanda	5.1	4.6	3.2	3.2	4.8	7.5
	I Sa	Tanzania	19.5	19.7	19.3			
	ving	Uganda	16.7	14.4	14.2	15.0	14.5	
	S	Zambia	25.8	27.6	30.0	31.2	32.0	32.5
		Zimbabwe						
		Angola	34.6	43.5	42.3	46.5	38.2	37.0
	GOV	Botswana	34.9	34.7	30.2		28.6	
	ern	Lesotho	64.8	55.3	51.1	66.1	64.4	64.9
	me	Kenya	25.6	23.4	26.4	27.9	29.9	
	nt R	Malawi	23.3	29.3	23.9	26.5		
	Government Revenue (% of GDP)	Mozambique	17.6	20.3	20.2			
	·е (9	Namibia	29.2	25.2	21.2			
	% of	Swaziland	36.2	24.6	25.8			
	GD	Rwanda	24.1	25.6	24.3	25.7	23.7	25.2
	Ē	Tanzania	16.2	15.4	16.6			
		Uganda	14.6	17.9	18.7	15.6	16.0	
		Zambia	16.0	17.8	21.7	22.7	20.9	21.0
		Zimbabwe	16.0	23.2	25.3	27.7	28.4	•••
	ရ	Angola	41.1	35.3	38.7	39.8	42.0	41.9
Governmen	ovei	Botswana					27.8	
ern	3	Lesotho	64.1	61.6	56.9	65.6	63.02	61.1
mei	ent	Kenya	36.3	32.1	37.5	36.6	47.4	
	EX	Malawi	27.6	28.0	26.8	30.1		
: Finance	Government Expenditure (% of GDP)	Mozambique						
	ure	Namibia	32.5	32.9	38.4	36.2	37.2	
	%	Swaziland						
	of G	Rwanda	26.3	25.7	27.7	26.9	28.8	30.0
	DP)	Tanzania						
		Uganda	16.2	23.7	25.8	18.2	19.2	
		Zambia			23.9	26.0	29.5	28.9
		Zimbabwe						
	ெற	Angola	-7.6	6.8	10.5	6.7	-3.8	-4.9
	Overa Excl. (GDP)	Botswana	-5.6	-6.4	-4.4			
	3II Fi Grai	Lesotho	-3.4	-11.8	-14.7	-8.5	-5.9	-0.1
	isca nts (Kenya	-5.75	-7.9	-5.36	-6.06	-8.34	
	l Ba	Malawi	-10.1	-8.0	-6.3	-12.4		
	Overall Fiscal Balance Excl. Grants (% of GDP)	Mozambique	-14.8	-12.2	-13.7			

	- 0	Namibia	1.1	4.6	7.1	-2.9	-6.4	
	Ove anc (% c	Swaziland	-7.1	-9.4	-9.5			•••
	Overall Fiscal Balance Excl. Grants (% of GDP)	Rwanda	-11.4	-13.2	-14.1	-12.4	-12.9	-13.7
	함은 표	Tanzania	-9.5	-11.0	-14.1			
	scal Gra	Uganda	-4.6	-7.2	-6.4	-5.3	-5.7	•••
	Ba	Zambia	-5.5	-4.9	-4.7	-7.3		0.7
	s -	Zimbabwe	-5.5	-4.9		-7.3	-12.1 -2.6	-9.7
Q.			44.1	28.3	-3.0 21.6	22.0		
ove	Gov	Angola				22.0		
e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e	/err	Botswana	5.7	6.7	16.1	42.2	42.7	
ner	l m	Lesotho	39.5	36.0	37.4	42.2	42.7	
Government Finance	ent	Kenya	44.12	48.05	54.21	50.03	51.72	
ina	De	Malawi	40.6	35.1	44.0	•••		•••
nce	bt (Mozambique	34.4	38.2	39.2	22.0	27.0	
	%	Namibia	17.6	15.5	25.1	23.8	27.8	
	Government Debt (% of GDP)	Swaziland	16.0	12.0	13.9		20.0	21.4
	DP	Rwanda	14.4	14.5	18.0	17.1	20.8	21.4
		Tanzania	40.1	40.9	43.8	 2C 2	29.1	
		Uganda	26.3	23.8	28.7	26.2		 2F 2
		Zambia	20.2	29.3	25.4	30.8	34.1	35.3
	_	Zimbabwe	109.3	94.3	90.3	62.0	56.0	 F1.6
	Expoi	Angola	61.9	62.4	65.4	62.9	30.0	51.6
	္ ရ	Botswana Lesotho	32.1 44.7	32.6 42.3	33.1 48.9	44.8	42.9	43.8
	s of		24.2	27.5	28.5	27.3		
	Exports of Goods and Services (% GDP)	Kenya Malawi	22.3	23.6	21.8	21.1	•••	•••
		Mozambique	29.2	27.8	26.7			
		Namibia	34.0	35.0	38.0	40.0	54.0	
		Swaziland	59.4	59.2	53.2			
		Rwanda	4.5	5.7	7.3	8.3	10.8	•••
		Tanzania	23.9	27.6	30.5		10.0	
	s (%	Uganda	19.6	20.8	22.0	23.0	23.0	•••
Ü	% of	Zambia	35.9	35.6	45.1	45.7	48.0	56.5
External Sector	-,,	Zimbabwe	31.9	38.3	44.4	35.7	35.1	30.3
na	0.11	Angola	-11.2	9.1	12.5	12.1	5.9	2.3
Se	exte	Botswana	-4.7	-5.0	-3.9		3.9	2.3
cto	External Current Account, Excluding Grants (% of GDP)	Lesotho	3.6	-7.5	-6.3	-10.4	-5.5	-3.5
	% C	Kenya	-6.6	-8.6				
	of C	Malawi	-15.8	-18.1	-13.0			
	ent SPP	Mozambique	-19.1	-18.1	-17.0	•••	•••	•••
	Acc	Namibia	-15.1	-12.9	-12.8	-14.4	-12.5	
	noc	Swaziland	-20.8	-12.9	-12.8	-14.4	-12.5	
	nt,	Rwanda	-17.2	-17.1	-13.3	-19.0	-18.8	-17.4
	Exc	Tanzania	-17.2	-17.1	-19.0	-13.0	-10.0	-17.4
	Jud	Uganda	-11.3	-11.7	-19.2	-9.8	-12.1	
	ing							1.6
		Zambia	1.8	5.6	2.9	-0.6	-2.0	-1.6
		Zimbabwe	-20.3	-20.3	-28.5	-19.1	-19.2	

		T						
	Re an	Angola	3.2	5.9	7.1	7.4	8.0	
	ser d S	Botswana	19.7	15.1	18.3			
	ves ervi	Lesotho	5.9	4.8	4.6	4.7	5.3	5.2
	Reserves (Mo	Kenya	4.1	3.9	3.7	4.3		
	ont	Malawi	1.9	3.1	2.3	1.1		
	shs	Mozambique	5.2	4.4	5.2	:		
	<u></u>	Namibia	4.0	3.0	3.8	3.4	2.7	
	a B	Swaziland	4.5	3.5	2.4	:		
	Reserves (Months of Imports of Goods and Services)	Rwanda	5.4	4.5	5.1	3.6	4.1	4.0
	<u>o</u>	Tanzania	6.2	5.8	4.0			
	စ္ခ	Uganda	5.4	4.02	3.7	4.4	4.2	
	spo	Zambia	5.4	4.0	3.7	2.8	2.7	2.5
_		Zimbabwe	1.2	1.0	0.6	0.7	0.6	
	<u> </u>	Angola	23.3	10.8	3.9	3.4	3.6	
	tere	Botswana	7.5	7.7	5.6			
_	et I	Lesotho	6.7	5.5	5.3	5.37	5.52	
Mo	Rat	Kenya	7.4	3.6	8.7	12.7		
Monetary Policy Indicators	es (Malawi	7.14	6.2	7.67	20.0		
	T-B	Mozambique	9.5	14.8	11.8			
	≅	Namibia	7.4	5.7	5.9	5.69	5.67	
licy	Interest Rates (T-Bill Rate)	Swaziland	7.9	6.6	6.2			
Ind	٣	Rwanda	8.7	7.8	7.1	9.9	9.6	
ica		Tanzania	6.9	6.3	18.2			
tors		Uganda	11.4	6.8	13.6	14.7	13.2	
9.		Zambia	6.3	6.3	7.1	9.4	7.8	8.5
_		Zimbabwe	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a
		Angola	19.1	20.5	13.1	14.7	14.2	
		Botswana	13.8	11.5	11.0			
		Lesotho	11.7	10.5	10.5	9.92	9.92	
	⊳	Kenya	14.8	14.4	15.0	19.7		
	Average Lending Rates	Malawi	19.25	19.25	17.75	17.75	36.2	
	age	Mozambique	19.9	19.9	23.6			
	Lei	Namibia	11.1	9.7	8.7	8.7	8.3	
	ndi	Swaziland	10.0	9.0	9.0			
		Rwanda	16.7	17.0	16.7	16.7	17.4	
	Rate	Tanzania	14.0	14.4	13.8			
	S	Uganda	21.0	20.2	21.8	26.2	24.0	
		Zambia	22.7	19.4	16.6	16.1	16.3	16.8
		Zimbabwe	1.24-25.0	1.26-60.0	8.0-30.0	10.0-35.0	6.0-35.0	

<u>Sources</u>: Member States Central Banks and Ministries of Finance. Fiscal Data refer to year ending June in some countries.

Table 2: De Facto Classification of Exchange Rate Arrangements and Monetary Policy Frameworks, April, 2011

Box 1-1: Classification of Exchange Rate Regimes

Category	Description
Exchange arrangements with no separate legal tender	The currency of another country circulates as the sole legal tender (formal dollarization), or the member belongs to a monetary or currency union in which the same legal tender is shared by the members of the union. Adopting such regimes implies the complete surrender of the monetary authorities' control over domestic monetary policy.
Currency board arrangements	A monetary regime based on an explicit legislative commitment to exchange domestic currency for a specified foreign currency at a fixed exchange rate, combined with restrictions on the issuing authority to ensure the fulfillment of its legal obligation. This implies that domestic currency will be issued only against foreign exchange and that it remains fully backed by foreign assets, leaving little scope for discretionary monetary policy and eliminating traditional central bank functions, such as monetary control and lender-of-last-resort. Some flexibility may still be afforded, depending on how strict the banking rules of the currency board arrangement are.
Conventional fixed peg arrangements	The country pegs its currency within margins of ±1 percent or less vis-à-vis another currency; a cooperative arrangement, such as the ERM II; or a basket of currencies, where the basket is formed from the currencies of major trading or financial partners and weights reflect the geographical distribution of trade, services, or capital flows. The currency composites can also be standardized, as in the case of the SDR. There is no commitment to keep the parity irrevocably. The exchange rate may fluctuate within narrow margins of less than ±1 percent around a central rate—or the maximum and minimum value of the exchange rate may remain within a narrow margin of 2 percent—for at least three months. The monetary authority maintains the fixed parity through direct intervention (i.e., via sale/purchase of foreign exchange in the market) or indirect intervention (e.g., via the use of interest rate policy, imposition of foreign exchange regulations, exercise of moral suasion that constrains foreign exchange activity, or through limited, is greater than in the case of exchange arrangements with no separate legal tender and currency boards because traditional central banking functions are still possible, and the monetary authority can adjust the level of the exchange rate, although relatively infrequently.

Category	Description
Pegged exchange rates within horizontal bands	The value of the currency is maintained within certain margins of fluctuation of more than ±1 percent around a fixed central rate or the margin between the maximum and minimum value of the exchange rate exceeds 2 percent. As in the case of conventional fixed pegs, reference may be made to a single currency, a cooperative arrangement, or a currency composite. There is a limited degree of monetary policy discretion, depending on the band width.
Crawling pegs	The currency is adjusted periodically in small amounts at a fixed rate or in response to changes in selective quantitative indicators, such as past inflation differentials vis-à-vis major trading partners, differentials between the inflation target and expected inflation in major trading partners. The rate of crawl can be set to adjust for measured inflation or other indicators (backward looking), or set at a preannounced fixed rate and/or below the projected inflation differentials (forward looking). Maintaining a crawling peg imposes constraints on monetary policy in a manner similar to a fixed peg system.
Exchange rates within crawling bands	The currency is maintained within certain fluctuation margins of at least ±1 percent around a central rate—or the margin between the maximum and minimum value of the exchange rate exceeds 2 percent—and the central rate or margins are adjusted periodically at a fixed rate or in response to changes in selective quantitative indicators. The degree of exchange rate flexibility is a function of the band width. Bands are either symmetric around a crawling central parity or widen gradually with an asymmetric choice of the crawl of upper and lower bands (in the latter case, there may be no preannounced central rate). The commitment to maintain the exchange rate within the band imposes constraints on monetary policy, with the degree of policy independence being a function of the band width.
Managed floating with no predetermined path for the exchange rate	The monetary authority attempts to influence the exchange rate without having a specific exchange rate path or target. Indicators for managing the rate are broadly judgmental (e.g., balance of payments position, international reserves, parallel market developments), and adjustments may not be automatic. Intervention may be direct or indirect.
Independently floating	The exchange rate is market-determined, with any official foreign exchange market intervention aimed at moderating the rate of change and preventing undue fluctuations in the exchange rate, rather than at establishing a level for it.

Source: IMF, April 2011.

Note: This classification system is based on IMF's actual, de facto, arrangements as identified by IMF staff, which may differ from the officially announced arrangements by its member States. It ranks exchange rate arrangements on the basis of their degree of flexibility and the existence of formal or informal commitments to exchange rate paths. It distinguishes among different forms of exchange rate regimes, in addition to arrangements with no separate legal tender, to help assess the implications of the choice of exchange rate arrangement for the degree of monetary policy independence. The system presents members' exchange rate regimes and monetary policy frameworks to provide greater transparency in the classification scheme and to illustrate the relationship between exchange rate regimes and different monetary policy frameworks. The following explains the categories.

Box 1-2 Exchange Rate Arrangements in the MEFMI Region as of April 30, 2011

Exchange Rate Arrangements	MEFMI Member Countries
No separate legal tender	Zimbabwe
Currency board arrangements	xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Conventional peg/Common Monetary Area	Lesotho, Namibia, Swaziland
Stabilised Arrangements	Malawi
Crawling pegs	Botswana
Craw-Like Arrangement	Rwanda
Pegged exchange rates within horizontal bands	xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Managed floating with no pre-determined path for the exchange rate	Angola
Floating	Kenya, Mozambique, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia
Freely Floating	xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

Source: IMF, De Facto Classification of exchange Rate Arrangements and Monetary Policy Frameworks, April, 2011.

Box 2: Exchange Rates Policy Regimes in the MEFMI Region

Туре	Description
Exchange Rate Anchor	The monetary authority stands ready to buy or sell foreign exchange at given quoted rates to maintain the exchange rate at its preannounced level or range; the exchange rate serves as the nominal anchor or intermediate target of monetary policy. This type of regime covers exchange rate regimes with no separate legal tender; currency board arrangements; fixed pegs with and without bands; and crawling pegs with and without bands.
Monetary Aggregate Anchor	The monetary authority uses its instruments to achieve a target growth rate for a monetary aggregate, such as reserve money, M1, or M2, and the targeted aggregate becomes the nominal anchor or intermediate target of monetary policy
Inflation Targeting Framework	This involves the public announcement of medium-term numerical targets for inflation with an institutional commitment by the monetary authority to achieve these targets. Additional key features include increased communication with the public and the markets about the plans and objectives of monetary policymakers and increased accountability of the central bank for attaining its inflation objectives. Monetary policy decisions are guided by the deviation of forecasts of future inflation from
	the announced target, with the inflation forecast acting (implicitly or explicitly) as the intermediate target of monetary policy.
Fund-Supported or other Monetary Program	This involves implementation of monetary and exchange rate policies within the confines of a framework that establishes floors for international reserves and ceilings for net domestic assets of the central bank. Indicative targets for reserve money may be appended to this system. Countries that maintain nominal anchors, exchange rate anchors, monetary anchors, or inflation targeting frameworks are classifies under those respective rubrics.
Other	The country has no explicitly stated nominal anchor but rather monitors various indicators in conducting monetary policy, or there is no relevant information available for the country.

Source: IMF, April 2011

Box 2-2: Monetary Policy Frameworks in the MEFMI Region as of July 31, 2010

Exchange Rate Anchor	Monetary Aggregate Target	Inflation Targeting Framework	IMF-Supported or other Monetary Program	Other
Angola	Kenya			
Botswana	Mozambique			
Lesotho	Rwanda			
Malawi	Tanzania			
Namibia	Uganda			
Swaziland	Zambia			
Zimbabwe				

Source: IMF, De Facto Classification of exchange Rate Arrangements and Monetary Policy Frameworks, April, 2011.

Table 3: Other Indicators

Table 3-1: Competitiveness Indicator in the MEFMI Region 2012/2013

	Country	Ranking	Score/10.00
1.	Rwanda	63	4.24
2.	Botswana	79	4.06
3.	Namibia	92	3.88
4.	Zambia	102	3.80
5.	Kenya	106	3.75
6.	Malawi	129	3.38
7.	Tanzania	120	3.60
8.	Uganda	123	3.53
9.	Zimbabwe	132	3.34
10.	Swaziland	135	3.28
11.	Mozambique	138	3.17
12.	Lesotho	137	3.29
13.	Mozambique	138	3.17

<u>Note</u>: The highest score in the 2012 report is for Switzerland, ranked top, with 5.72, while the lowest is Burundi, ranked 144, with 2.78. The highest for Sub-Saharan Africa is South Africa, ranked 52nd with a score of 4.37 followed by Mauritius in 54th place with 4.35 and Rwanda in 63th place with a score of 4.24.

Table 3-2: Ease of Doing Business in the MEFMI Region -2012/2013

	Ease of Doing Business Rank	Starting a Business	Dealing with Construction Permits	Getting Electricity	Registering Property	Getting Credit	Protecting Investors	Paying Taxes	Trading Across Borders	Enforcing Contracts	Resolving Insolvency
Rwanda	45	8	84	50	61	8	29	19	155	39	165
Botswana	54	90	132	91	50	48	46	22	150	65	28
Namibia	78	125	52	105	145	24	79	102	142	40	56
<u>Zambia</u>	84	69	148	118	96	8	79	47	153	85	96
Kenya	109	132	37	115	133	8	97	166	141	127	92
Uganda	123	143	109	129	127	48	133	93	158	116	63
Swaziland	124	161	47	158	128	48	122	60	148	171	69
Tanzania	127	123	176	78	158	98	97	129	92	36	122
Mozambiq ue	139	70	126	172	156	150	46	107	136	131	143
Lesotho	143	144	157	141	150	150	147	61	147	102	71
Malawi	145	139	167	177	95	126	79	23	164	121	132
Zimbabwe	171	144	166	167	85	126	122	127	172	112	153
Angola	172	167	115	120	129	126	65	149	163	181	160

<u>N.B.</u>: (i) Economies are ranked on their ease of doing business, from 1 – 183. A high ranking on the ease of doing business index means the regulatory environment is more conducive to the starting and operation of a local firm. This index averages the country's percentile rankings on 10 topics, made up of a variety of indicators, giving equal weight to each topic. The rankings for all economies are benchmarked to June 2011.

(ii) In the world, Singapore is ranked top (1) while Chad is ranked the lowest at 183. The highest for Sub-Saharan Africa is Mauritius (23) followed by South Africa (35), Rwanda (45), and Botswana (54) and Ghana (63).